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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
(; It1\XT Sl~O'fT HASL1\:\I, 
Plaintiff and .Li_ppellant~ 
vs. 
1)1\lTL ll1\ULSEN, P. H. P.r\UL-
SEN,AND BYRON PAULSEN 
dba .t\l~~IE l~,RANE RENTAL 
c:o~Il)1\NY, HYRUM PETER-
SI1:X, THE CORPORATION OF 
'fHE PRESIDING BISHOP OF 
THE C H U R C H OF JESUS 
CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY 
S.i\l~'l"S, a corporation sole, and 
li,l{.i\NI( COTTRELL, 
Defendan,ts and Respondents. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
No. 
9938 
Throughout this Brief, all emphasis is ours. 
STATE:\IEXT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action for personal injuries to plaintiff 
who "~as injured 'vhen he received a charge of elec-
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tricity from a crane boom cable and bucket owned by 
defendants Paulsen and operated by their agent, de-
fendant Petersen, while the plaintiff was delivering 
ready-mix concrete on premises to which he had been 
invited as a business invitee. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to a jury. Following a verdict 
and judgment for the plaintiff against the respondent 
defendants, not including the Church, the trial court 
vacated the verdict and judgment and ordered a new 
trial. From this order plaintiff appeals. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
. . 
Plaintiff seeks a ru1ing that the trial court's order 
granting a new trial was an abuse of its discretion, 
and for a reinstatement of the full amount of the 
judgment which the trial court vacated. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Late in 1959, construction of an L.D.S. chapel 
was commenced on Wasatch Boulevard just south of 
Thirteenth South. The property was owned by the 
Church and the Church itself was the builder. On or 
about December 18, 1959, at the request of the Church, 
three 7200 volt power lines were installed on the prem-
ises carried by utility poles from a point on the north 
side of Thirteenth South. The poles were erected on a 
line more or less north and south until they reached 
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npproxirnately .>:! feet frorn the buil<ling foundation. 
Frorn this point the line continued to a pole a distance 
of tiO feet in a \Vest south,vest direction. Four "·ires. 
anchored hy the top cross bars on the poles, ran side 
by side. 'rhe line on the south side and the two north 
Jines \rere }iYe. rfhe other line WaS neutral, and each of 
the three liYe lines carried 7~00 volts (R. 194) and were 
exposed and uninsulated. (R. 196). They were approxi-
rnately :!() to :!7 feet above the ground. (R. 195, 337) . 
..: \ n1onth after the lines were installed, the L~hurch 
ordered so1ne ready-mix concrete from Utah Sand and 
(~-ravel l'lornpany, to be delivered in the latter com-
pany's trucks and by its personnel. The Church also 
arranged 'vith defendant, Acme Crane Rental Com-
pany, to furnish a crane, a crane operator and an oiler 
to lift the ready-mix concrete from the delivery trucks 
to the foundation of that part of the building which 
\Vas adjacent to the high voltage wires. Defendant, 
Frank (..,ottrell, an employee of the Church, was the 
foreman in charge of the operation and he and defend-
ant. Hyrum Petersen, the crane operator, conferred 
as to "·here to put the crane for the concrete lift job. 
'fhey both knew of the exposed high voltage 'vires and 
because of the proximity of the wires to the area where 
the concrete '"as to be poured, they discussed the prob-
lein of "·here the crane should be placed. (R. 353-35~, 
389-390) . The crane had a sixty-foot boom with a 30-
foot jib extension ( R. 356) from 'vhich a cable hung . 
... -\ bucket "~as attached to the end of the cable for 
carrying the concrete. Cottrell and Petersen agreed 
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that the only place to put the crane was between the 
wires and the foundation forms, and that is where it 
was placed. ( R. 353-354, 366, 385-389) . The distance 
between the wires and the forms was approximately 40 
feet. (Exhibit 2 D) . They further agreed to, and in 
fact did, proceed with the unloading of the concrete 
without arranging for the de-energizing of the south 
wire which could have been done without depriving the 
workmen of necessary power. (R. 354, 196). Although 
the south line could have been insulated in two and 
one-half to three hours time with fibre eels (R. 196-
198, Exhibit 3 P), Petersen and Cottrell proceeded 
with the unloading operation without insulating any 
of the wires against the danger that they knew existed 
( R. 390) ; and, finally, they proceeded to allow the 
invitee truck drivers, including plaintiff, to come into 
the danger zone without warning them of the dangerous 
nature of the area into which they were invited to 
unload their concrete. (R. 354, 248). The defendant 
Petersen, as Paulsen's agent, also proceeded to operate 
the crane with the boom swinging over to, and making 
contact with, the wire in an arc capable of extending 
several score feet beyond the wire (R. 401, and Map 
Exhibit 2D), even though he knew that the safety cus-
tom of crane operators was never to let any part of 
the crane or boom get within eight feet of a utility 
wire ( R. 397) , and also even though he knew it was 
impossible for him to see and have a clear vision of 
the cable when it came close to the wire. (R. 405-406, 
423-424) . Defendants Paulsen had furnished the 
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Church \rith an oiler whose job, among other things. 
was to nssist the crane operator and people delivering 
conl'tTte for pouring and to keep the operation safe. 
(It 4:~:!. :!:J7. 383-38-t). But when the l~ tab Sand and 
( ;raYel drivers, including plaintiff, arrived and un-
loaded, this oiler \vas not at the scene of the electrical 
danger to assist. ( R. ~-t8). 
In such restricted area for a 90-foot boom to ope-
rate, the defendant, Hyrum Petersen, commenced 
unloading ready-tnix concrete between noon and 1 :00 
p.n1. on Jan nary 19, 1960. ( R. 206, 366) . The trucks 
had been loaded at the Utah Sand and Gravel Com-
pany's X orth Plant on Beck Street, and its employees, 
the drivers of the trucks, had received their orders from 
the con1pany's North Plan,t personnel as to where to 
deliver the concrete. 'fhe driver of the truck carrying 
the first load "·as Dave ''r alker (R. 355, 390), who 
backed his truck up to a point underneath the exposed 
high voltage wires. He was not aware that he was near 
any "·ires, nor, of course, that they were of high voltage 
and exposed. ( R. 208) . 
''Thile '\Talker "·as unloading~ the plaintiff drove 
onto the site "·ith the next load of concrete to be un-
loaded. He drove in from Thirteenth South, turned 
his truck to the "·est, then backed it up so that he was 
facing north and ready to back up as soon as ''r alker 
"·as finished. (R. 242-243). He waited for approxi-
mately 10 to 15 minutes and remained in the truck 
\vhere it "·as 'varm. It "·as a cold day and plaintiff 
kne,,· of no reason to get out of the truck. (R. 249, 
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212) . Then, after Walker pulled out, plaintiff backed 
his truck up in the same path along which Walker had 
driven. He also did not see the wires because like 
Walker, he had to concentrate on spotting the truck 
to the bucket, 'vhich took his complete attention. (R. 
247-248, 207) . They both backed up by use of the side 
view mirrors and the terrain was uneven. ( R. 243, 207) . 
Neither the poles nor the wires were within the view 
of their side view mirrors, nor had they become aware 
of the wires from any other view. (R. 247, 208). After 
backing to the point indicated by the place where the 
bucket rested, plaintiff got out of the truck, went to 
the back thereof, and swung the pouring chute from 
the east side of the truck, where it had been fastened, to 
a point where it could pour into the bucket. But the 
chute, thus extended out from the truck, was approxi-
mately one foot short of the bucket. (R. 244, 248). 
The crane operator, Hyrum Petersen, then caused the 
bucket to be swung closer to the truck but in doing 
so the bucket went too far and struck the truck. (R. 
246). Plaintiff, who was standing on the ground at 
the west side of the chute, involuntarily and spon-
taneously reached for the bucket to push it away from, 
and to the south of, the back end of the truck where it 
had just made momentary contact. (R. 246, 451). As 
he grabbed the lip of the bucket with his right hand 
to push it away from the truck (R. 246), he received 
an electrical charge. ( R. 246, 249) . The cable holding 
the bucket extending from the 90-foot boom had made 
contact with the south 7200 volt wire. ( R. 210, 211). 
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}l(aintitl' n1ornentarily remained conscious just long 
t·nough to n1ake a tre1nendous effort to break loose 
frorn the juice (It. 249) and he also remembers falling 
bat·k,ranls and lighting on the frozen ground on his 
left shoulder before losing consciousness. (R. ~49). He 
'ras 'vearing rubber overshoes or galoshes (R. 249) and 
he also had rubber soles on his shoes. (R. 457). His 
hands \Vere protected by gloves. (R. 249, 252). The 
truck. of course, had rubber tires, and it is conjectured 
that these protections prevented plaintiff from getting 
the fu 11 force of the 7200 volts, which otherwise, pre-
sunlably \vould haYe caused his immediate death. 
Dave '\Talker, who had been cleaning the pouring 
chute of his truck, ran over to the plaintiff ( R. 209) , 
and he describes him as unconscious, with the pupils of 
his eyes rolled back so that only the whites of his eyes 
\\'ere seen. ( R. 209) . He also said that the bucket was 
just above the ground, that a blue flame was running 
frorn the bucket to the ground, and that the cable was in 
contact "·ith the utility wire. (R. 210). He then saw the 
crane operator., Hyrum Petersen, pull the cable and 
bucket a"·ay from the wire and thus break the electrical 
contact. (R. 211). ,.fhe crane itself was on rubber wheels 
and also resting on out-riggers. (R. 398, 273). Breaking 
the contact before he stepped to the ground from the 
crane undoubtedly saved Mr. Petersen from getting the 
electrical current. ( R. 425-426) . 
Plaintiff soon regained consciousness and after 
son1e delay "\vas driven to see Dr. Silas Smith at South 
Temple and Fifth East. Plaintiff was able to get around 
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under his own power. (R. 452). His hands were burned 
(R. 250-251), and he had pain in his left shoulder. (R. 
250, 453). He was examined, X-rays were taken, and 
his burns were treated. (R. 250). He returned to the 
doctor next day (R. 250, 252) and he continued to see 
Dr. Smith until April 1, 1960, making about 12 visits 
during that time. (R. 252). While making these visits, 
plaintiff continued to work, but it was difficult and pain-
ful and he was given limited duties on the job. (R. 254). 
Dr. Smith, in diagnosing the source of P.laintiff's con-
tinued pain, told him that he had arthritis in his shoulder 
and that is was something he would have to live with. 
(R. 252, 340, 382). For the next several months plain-
tiff did live with the pain thinking there was nothing he 
could do about it. (R. 340). But the pain continued to 
get worse ( R. 340) , his left arm and shoulder were get-
ting smaller (R. 262), and in November, 1960, (R. 254-
255) he decided to seek further medical help. (R. 340, 
262) . After spending a month or two with a chiro-
practor, he saw his family doctor, Dr. Wilson, who sent 
him to Dr. Pemberton, an orthopedic specialist. (R. 297-
298). Plaintiff gave Dr. Pemberton the history or source 
of his injury as of January 19, 1960, 'vhen he received 
the charge of electricity and was thrown on his left 
shoulder and said that his injury had caused him to have 
pain in his shoulder which had been getting worse. (R. 
298). Dr. Pemberton observed a prominence of the outer 
aspect of the left cia vicle or collar bone. There was 
tenderness over the joint between the collar bone and 
the shoulder blade, and over the front end of the shoul-
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der and out to the outer aspect. 'rhere was weakness in 
lifting the arn1 up and sotne restriction of motion in 
pulling it straight up into the air. (R. 298). After some 
prelirninary treatn1ent, Dr. Pemberton recommended 
surgery (R. 1~~) which he performed on or about 
l•'ebruary 8, 1961. He found that the pain was caused by 
( 1) an inflamed bursa under the deltoid muscle, the 
n1usele that lifts the arm out and forms a cap over the 
top of the shoulder ( R. 299) , and ( 2) adhesions or scar 
tissue 'vhich had formed between the muscle layers and 
the bone ligaments about the ball or joints between the 
collar bone and the shoulder blade. ( R. 301) . This scar 
tissue occurred from a jerking and strain on the attach-
ment of the muscles and created inflammation or perio-
arthritis about the joint. (R. 301). 
Dr. Pemberton "·as able to remove the inflamed bursa 
and thus remove the cause of the pain from that source 
( R. 300) but there "·as nothing that surgery or any 
kno"·n treatment could do to eliminate the pain from 
the adhesions. (R. 301). Both Dr. Smith and Dr. Pem-
berton believed that this latter pain would remain during 
plaintiff's lifetime. (R. 301, 340, 382). Dr. Pemberton 
n1akes specific reference to the plaintiff's injuries which 
occurred on January 19, 1960, as the source of his dis-
ability (R. 302, 318), and suggests that the muscle dam-
age may haYe occurred from a jerking or contracting 
of the muscles '"hen they were stimulated by the elec-
trical impulse rather than from a jar or fall. (R. 301, 
31-t 320). He estimates a 10 to 15 per cent permanent 
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partial disability of the arm at the shoulder due to 
muscle weakness. ( R. 303) . 
Plaintiff was unable to work for three months fol-
lowing the operation. (R. 257). His left arm had shrunk 
to about the size of his wrist and during his conval-
escence he performed certain exercises to restore as much 
as possible the muscles and the normal size of his arm. 
(R. 257-259). Among the things he did to help build 
up his arm was to assist in a very limited way in some 
construction work which he had contracted out in the 
building of an addition to his home. l-Ie undertook this 
upon the recommendation of the doctor. (R. 289-290, 
337-338, 456) . While the effect of the operation has 
been to reduce the pain in his shoulder and arm, it has 
not eliminated it. His efforts to restore his muscles 
during convalescence was accompanied with much pain 
(R. 259-260}, and upon his return to work as a truck 
driver, he was again forced to use his shoulder and arm 
muscles, and such use was constantly associated with 
pain (R. 259-261), although not so great as before the 
operation. (R. 259-260). Inasmuch as the pain is not as 
constant and intense now as it was before the operation, 
plaintiff believes the operation was very beneficial. (R. 
262-263) . Nevertheless, plaintiff can avoid much of the 
pain only by not using his arm and shoulder muscles, and 
he has chosen to use them to he extent required by his 
work, and to the extent required to keep, as much as 
possible, a healthy and normal size arm and shoulder. 
As as result of such use he has suffered, he does suffer, 
and will continue to suffer pain; the more he uses his 
10 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
urn1 and shoulder. the n1ore they pain hi1n; the less he 
uses tlu:rn, the n1ore the n1uscles atrophe and ''waste 
:nvny'' on hitn. (Unnumbered page between R. 261 and 
:!ti:!). 
I I is pains and disabilities have had certain effects 
on his daily life and activities 'vhich Inay be listed as 
follows: 
1. l-Ie reduced the amount of working time as an 
employee of Utah Sand and Gravel Company as much 
as it was possible and still keep his job (R. 260), which 
resulted in an annual wage loss of approximately 
*HJ7.00. (Exhibit 16 P). 
:!. Prior to January 19, 1960, he }jked his work, even 
overtin1e hours, 'vhich he could have to any extent 
desired because of his seniority (R. 241), but he changed 
to not liking his 'vork at all because of the pain associated 
\vith his work. (R. 260). He avoided overtime hours 
\rhen it \vas possible. ( R. 260) . 
3. Finally he took another job on the suggestion of 
his doctor ( R. 20~) , "~hich resulted in less pay than the 
reduced amount he had most recently been earning as a 
truck driver. 
4 .... -\.t home he has become nervous and irritable 
\vith his "·ife and children and prone to "blow up over 
little things that never bothered him before," as if he 
didn · t ha Ye any control over it. ( R. 263, 350) . 
5. His sleeping, which had been "sound and still," 
changed to a condition of constant "turning and jerk-
ing around, just moving all night.'' (R. 350-351). 
11 
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6. He used to enjoy bowling as a recreation, but 
now he no longer enjoys it and avoids it. (R. 349, 35I). 
As a hunter he became considerably limited in what he 
could do. (R. 340, 348). 
7. He is now unable and restricted in doing, or is 
not inclined to do, the chores and work around his home. 
(R. 348). 
8. He avoids stripping to the waist in public in 
sport situations where it is customary to do such for he 
is self-conscious about the large incisional scar result-
ing from the operation. (R. 349, Exhibits 10 P, II P, 
12 P). 
He cannot now trust his arm and shoulder to lift 
things above his head. (Unnumbered page between 
R. 261-262). 
10. He cannot rest any object on his left shoulder 
because of the pain from contact with the bony promi-
nence at the joint due to the muscle atrophe. (Unnum-
bered page between R. 255-256, R. 320) . 
The foregoing are the results of a fixed and per-
manent condition, the central feature of which is pain in 
the shoulder and arm when they are used. 
When plaintiff was injured in January, 1960, he 
was a young man of 26 years, a high sch~ol graduate 
as of June, 1951, married and the father of three young 
children. Since then they have had one more child. (R. 
239). His occupational experience since high school has 
been limited (except for a year's work at Dugway, 
where he operated heavy equipment) to his work for 
12 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
{ Ttah Sand and (;ravel l.,o1npany, driving ready-mix 
trucks. I I e had built up good seniority by the tin1e of 
the aecident. lie "·as the 11th or 1:Zth in seniority out of 
~30 or .>.> n1en. ( R. 240). He "·as not skilled in any other 
work. lie liked his \Vork as a truck driver driving ready-
rnix trueks and, prior to his injuries, liked to, and did, 
aeeept as tnuch overtime work as he could get, 'vhich 
'rork "·as generously available for him because of his 
seniority. (R. i40-241}. 
'fhe mortality tables show his life expectancy fron1 
the titne of the trial \vhen he was 29 years old to be 
approximately from 40 to 44 years. 
His wage loss in 1961, the year of his operation, as 
compared \rith 1959, his last normal year, was $1381.00. 
(It 264-:!09, 347-348, Exhibit 16 P). This is figured 
by using his 1962 wage rate as a norm. 
All during 196:! plaintiff was as well and as fully 
recovered as he "'"ill ever be, and his wage loss that year 
\\·as $U57.00 (R. 264-269, 347-348, Exhibit 16 P), as 
con1pared with his last normal year of 1959. Note the 
similarity of his income in 1957, 1958 and 1959. Plain-
. 
tiff's 19{)2 'vage loss is arrived at by using his rate of 
hourly \vage in 1962 for all years figured, and charting 
such income fron1 the hours actually worked. 
Plaintiff's special damages amounted to $558.80 
but plaintiff's counsel neglected to ask Dr. Smith if 
$101.50 charged by him together 'vith X-rays taken 
under his auspices 'vere reasonable, so the court reduced 
13 
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the special damage to $457.30 which was the amount 
that Dr. Pemberton accounted for. (R. 303-304). 
At the close of the evidence, each of the defendants 
presented certain motions to the court. Some motions 
were granted, others were denied. (R. 479-492). Among 
the motions made by the defendants Paulsen and Peter-
sen, was a motion to dismiss plaintiff's action upon two 
grounds: 
I. That plaintiff was contributorily negligent as a 
matter of law in failing to examine the place where he 
unloaded the truck. ( R. 479) . 
2. 'That plaintiff failed to prove at the time of the 
accident that defendant Petersen, the crane operator, 
was an employee of Paulsens'; that in fact plaintiff was 
a servant of the Church. ( R. 480) . 
These defendants also moved the court 
"to strike from the record all testimony relat-
ing to loss of earnings on the part of plaintiff, 
past or future, all exhibits on special damage, 
testimony relating to Dr. Pemberton's treatment 
and operation charges, including hospital bills, 
and all claims that plaintiff has for permanent 
disability or pain arising from Dr. Pemberton's 
operation and treatment of plaintiff." (R. 491). 
As to the motion to dismiss, the court saw no merit 
to either of the grounds given and denied the motion. 
(R. 481-482, 486). As to the motion to strike, the 
court denied that motion, but expressed serious reser-
vations as to his ruling, and invited defendants to move 
for judgment notwithstanding the verdict if the verdict 
14 
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did not satisfy thcrn. (It. 492). In n1aking this recom-
rnerulation, the court added its own vie'v that because 
plaintiff did not return to Dr. Smith for further treat-
tnent, but instead \Vent to other doctors following the 
19()0 deer hunt, the jury could infer that his injury 
oct·urred at that time rather than in January. The court 
bases this observation upon Dr. Smith's statement as 
related by the court: 
"I told hin1 if this continued to hurt him to 
eon1e in and see me." ( R. 491-493) . 
X either respondent moved for a directed verdict, 
hut the Paulsens did request instructions covering their 
objections on grounds which were the basis of their 
n1otions for judgment n.o.v. 
In its instructions the court presented the jury with 
special interrogatories and the jury made the following 
specific findings ( R. 142-145) : 
1. That each defendant was negligent. 
2. That defendant Petersen's negligence was the 
proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries, and that defen-
dants Paulsen "·ere also proximately responsible because 
Petersen "·as their agent acting within the scope of his 
employment. 
3. That each defendant was guilty of wanton and 
reckless conduct. 
~. That plaintiff 'Yas not contributorily negligent. 
5. That plaintiff's special damages amounted to 
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In submitting its special interrogatories it appears 
that the court did not give the jury an opportunity to 
answer specifically whether the Church's negligent con-
duct was also a proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries. 
Since the jury did not, therefore, make such a finding 
the Church moved the court for judgment in favor of 
the Church and against plaintiff, "no cause of action." 
(R. 148-149). Judgment was accordingly entered in 
favor of the Church. (R. 150-151). 
Responding to plaintiff's motion for judgment, 
the court entered judgment in his favor and against the 
Paulsens and Petersen in the sum of $50,457.30, and 
also entered judgment in the same amount in favor of 
the Paulsens and against the defendant Petersen. (R. 
166-167). 
Following the verdict and the judgment, respon-
dents moved the court to grant judgment in favor of 
the defendants, respectively, and against plaintiff of 
"no cause of action" non obstante verdicto on the spe-
cific grounds that 
"as a matter of law, the evidence showed the 
plaintiff's exclusive remedy was workmen's com-
pensation'', and 
"As a matter of law, the evidence showed that 
plaintiff was contributorily negligent in proxi-
nlately causing his own injury, and likewise, as 
a matter of law, plaintiff failed to show wanton 
and wilful! misconduct". (R. 157, 164-165). 
In connection with this motion, respondents also 
moved for a remittitur of all special damages and 
16 
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* tH,OOO.OO of the general darnages. 'fhe court refused 
to grant these n1otio11s. (R. 1~>7, 16-t-1()~3}. 
Itespondents also n1oved the court, pursuant to 
l{ule 50 (b), to set aside the verdict and judgment on 
the t'vo grounds listed above and the further ground 
that 
H~ \s a matter of law, the plaintiff failed to 
prove by a preponderance of the evidence any 
darnages, except general damages for the pain 
and the burn on hands or the bruise on his shoul-
der." (R. 157, 164-165}. 
Respondents also filed a motion for a new trial 
upon the following grounds: 
I. Excessive damages appearing to have been 
given under the influence of passion and preju-
dice. 
2. Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the 
verdict, and that it is against law. 
3. Error in la"~. (R. 159, 162). 
These latter two motions were granted as appears 
in the following Order: 
"I'I' IS HEREBY ORDERED, AD-
JlTDC;.ED AXD DECREED that the verdict 
herein and the judgment entered thereon in favor 
of the plaintiff and against the defendants, Paul 
Paulsen, P. H. Paulsen and Byron Paulsen, 
dba Acme Crane Rental Company, and the de-
fendant, Hyrum Petersen, on April 24, 1963, 
be set aside and vacated as against the defend-
ants Paul Paulsen, P. H. Paulsen and Byron 
Paulsen and Hyrum Petersen, and the verdict 
and judgment against these defendants are 
17 
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hereby set aside and vacated, and the defendants, 
Paul Paulsen, P. H. Paulsen and Byron Paul-
sen, dba Acme Crane Rental Company, and the 
defendant, Hyrum Petersen's motion for a new 
trial on issues of liability and damages is hereby 
granted. 
Dated this 15th day of May, 1963. 
Merrill C. Faux, Judge" (R. 171) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE EVIDENCE SUPPOR'l"'S 'rHE 
FINDINGS: (I) THAT DEFENDANT, 
HYRUM PETERSEN, WAS NEGLIGENT; 
(2) THAT PLAINTI~,F WAS NOT CON-
TRIBUTORILY NEGLIGENT; (3) THAT 
DEFENDANT PETERSEN'S NEGLIGENT 
CONDUCT WAS THE PROXI}IIATE CAUSE 
OF PLAINTIFF'S INJURIES; (4) THAT 
DEFENDANT PETERSEN'S CONDUCT 
WAS ALSO WANTON AND RECKLESS; 
AND (5) THAT PLAIN'l"'IFF WAS INJURED 
BY DEFENDANT HYRUM PETERSEN 
WHILE SAID DEFENDANT WAS ACT-
ING AS AGENT FOR THE DEFENDANTS 
PAULSEN AND WITHIN THE SCOPE OF 
HIS EMPLOYMENT. 
A case unusually similar as to the essential factual 
elements of this case is Johanson vs. Cudahy Packing 
Company, 107 Utah 114, cited in 69 ALR 2nd 170. 
18 
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In the trial court a motion to distniss the complaint 
was granted. ,-fhere "·as~ therefore, no trial and the 
appeal \ras taken on the strength of the allegations in 
the co1nplaint. 'fhe action 'vas to recover for the death 
of a truck driYer 'vho was delivering a load of salt to 
Cudahy. llis death occurred when the truck he was 
driYing n1ade contact with a live, uninsulated electric 
\rire stretched across an alleyway as the deceased was 
backing up the truck to the point where delivery was 
to be made. Factual details of importance as well as 
the Ia"· "·ith respect to business visitors are contained 
in the following excerpt from the court's opinion: 
"The complaint alleges that the deceased was 
delivering a load of salt which the defendant 
had ordered from the deceased's employer. Driv-
ers delivering goods purchased by the occupier 
of premises are invitees. * * * The best state-
ment of the liability of the occupier of premises 
to"·ard an inYitee which has come to our atten-
tion may be found in Bohlen, 'Studies in the 
La"· or Torts', page 183. The rule is there stated 
as follows: 
'The position of the 'business guest' is some-
"·hat better than that of the 'bare licensee'. 
''
1hile the owner is bound to disclose to both 
any defect of which he knows and which he 
should recognize as creating a risk of injury 
to either, he may assume that the bare licensee, 
knowing that the owner has no interest in his 
visit and, therefore, cannot be expected to have 
tnade special preparations for his coming, will 
be on the alert to discover for himself the true 
condition of the premises; 'vhile a business 
guest, being entitled to expect to find the 
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premises put in order for his visit, is not to be 
expected to discover defects unusual in a 
properly prepared business premises. And 
the owner having an interest in the business 
invitee's visit, must by inspection ascertain 
the actual condition of the premises, so that 
ignorance due to a failure in inspection will 
not excuse his failure to give warning, while 
he owes no such duty to a bare licensee, it be-
ing immaterial that it would cost the owner a 
very slight effort to make an effective inspec-
tion and that it would be impossible for the 
licensee to make such an inspection in the 
course of his very temporary use of the prem-
ises'. 
"Here the defective portion of the premises 
consisted of the very approach which was pre-
pared by the defendant for the deceased's use. 
The deceased_, as an invitee_, had the right to ex-
pect to find the premises in a reasonably safe 
condition and t'lhould not be expected to discover 
defects unusual in a properly prepared business 
premises. The alleged defect does not arise from 
a natural condition of the lands. It is true that 
if the defective or dangerous condition is obvious 
so that any reasonably prudent person would 
be expected to see it and appreciate its danger, 
the occupier of the land would not be negligent 
in failing to warn said person of said defect or 
danger. But it does not appear from the allega-
tions of the complaint that these wires were so 
located that any reasonable person backing a 
truck through the alley,vay 'vould be reasonably 
expected to see them, or if he saw them_, to assume 
that they were highly dangerous. * * * It also 
appears that these wires were above eye level-
that is, that they were approximately 11 feet 
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frotn the ground. Under these circu1nstances, 
\Ve nre not prepared to hold that the defendant 
had no duty to "·arn the deceased of the presence 
of these \rires and of their high voltage or that 
deceased could be held as a matter of la\v to be 
guilty of contributory negligence". 
"It likewise cannot be said that the defendant 
\Vas free from negligence in permitting this dan-
gerous condition to exist as distinguished from 
the mere failure to warn. This approach was pre-
pared for the very purpose for which the de-
cea~ed teas usiny it. He had the right to e(rpcct 
the defendant to inspect it and to prepare for his 
cotniny. One cannot with prudence maintain a 
highl/f dangerous condition on a portion of the 
pre 111 ises "loh ich business invitees are expected to 
usc and travel. It is dangerous and negligent 
to mai·ntain a high voltage wire across an ap-
proach at such a low level that persons re~on­
ably expected to travel there ~ business invitees 
rcill come in contact with it. This would be dan-
gerous even though it was obvious and even 
though a re~onably prudent person would be 
l\l'pccted to see it. Of course, in nearly every 
case 'vhere the occupier of land warned the in-
vitee of the presence of danger, he could escape 
liability for any ensuing injury happening to 
the invitee thereafter. Anyone knowing of the 
existence of the danger and proceeding anyway 
n1ight under certain conditions be guilty of con-
tributory negligence. * * * But the mere fact 
that these 'vires might have been so located that 
the deceased should have seen them did not dis-
close that the defendant was free from all negli-
gence in maintaining the wires across this ap-
proach. * * * " 
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In the case of Kelley vs. Summers, 210 Fed. 2nd 
665, 672, lOth Circuit (Kansas), 1954, two men, Jones 
and.Martin, were victims of an electrical current. Defen-
dant, Kelley, sought to escape liability on the ground 
of contributory negligence on the part of Jones and 
Martin. 
"The point," said the court, "is amplified by 
the argument that Jones and Martin had the 
clearest view and opportunity to observe the high 
tension line and to avoid the danger by simply 
dropping their hold on the hooks and that their 
failure to keep a proper lookout and assert rea-
sonable care to avoid danger constituted negli-
gence on their part. W ray was operating the 
tractor and boo1n. It was his duty to know the 
position of the boom_, to exercise reasonable care 
in observing co·nditions immediately adjacent to 
the boom_, to exercise reasonable care to discover 
the presence of the high tension line_, and to exer-
cise like care to preve·nt .the boom coming into 
contact with the wire. The duties of Jones and 
Martin were to place the hooks in the ends of 
the pipe lying on the ground, to guide the pipe 
when elevated to its position on the truck, and 
then to disengage the hooks from the pipe. It 
was not their duty or responsibility to keep a 
lookout to see that the boom did not come into 
contact with a high tension wire or other object 
above the work being done. * * * " 
In the Kelley vs. Summers case it appears that the 
men who received the charge had the better opportunity 
to see the wires if they had been looking for them. But 
their job was such as to keep their attention otherwise 
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But suppose a case where a plaintiff knew of the 
wires, and in fact had worked in close proximity thereto 
for several weeks. Such is the situation in Erbes vs. 
lJnion Electrical Company, 353 SW 2nd 659, (Mo.), 
IHti:!. 'rhis \vas an action for injuries sustained by a 
construction worker when a cable he was holding con-
tacted the defendant-electrical company's overhead sub-
transtnission line. The wires were in plain sight, the 
plaintiff and other workmen all worked around and 
under the wires and knew of the wires. However, the 
plaintiff's foreman said he did not know the wires carried 
electricity or that they were uninsulated or that they 
\vere high-voltage wires. A plaintiff admitted that he 
had seen the wires but did not know that they were 
uninsulated and didn't think they carried electricity, 
nlthough he said he would not have touched them 
deliberately. He had worked on the job in the vicinity 
of the 'vires for about five weeks. Plaintiff recovered 
a judgment and it "'as affirmed on appeal. 
In Brown Ys. Arrington Construction Company, 
262 }:lac 2nd 789, cited at 69 ALR 2nd 182, (Idaho) , 
1953, the plaintiff was not a business invitee and he 
kne'v of the power line and of its danger when he 
approached the area where the machinery was working 
near the power line. Even so, the court upheld his 
recoYery for damages. In that case the defendant was 
hired by the county to remove debris from a canal over 
"·hich a new bridge was to be constructed. The county 
loaned one of its employees to the defendant to operate 
the crane and drag line. The canal ran north and south, 
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the road, east and west. There was a power line 28 feet 
above ground carrying 7200 volts of electricity on the 
south side of the road also running east and west. The 
crane was placed in a position south of the road and 
under the power line. It had a 40-foot boom. The plain-
tiff was sent by the county with a road grader to build 
a detour around the bridge site so that the flow of traffic 
would be uninterrupted during bridge construction 
operations. The crane was east of the canal. About noon 
plaintiff completed his job and drove the grader a short 
distance east of the work area and then on foot returned, 
and approached the drag line. At this point there is a 
conflict in the testimony as to whether the drag line was 
then in operation. It was Brown's testimony that it was 
not and that the bucket was on the ground when he 
approached. He said that he knew it was dangerous 
to approach the drag line when it was in operation 
under the power line. After talking briefly with Skin-
ner, the drag line opera tor, he started to leave. As he 
left Skinner put the drag line in operation and moved 
the bucket. "Brown saw a corner of the drag line sud-
denly seem to be afire. Contact was made, not know-
ingly, between Brown and the drag line and he was 
knocked unconscious and thrown to the ground." 
The foregoing cases entirely support the validity 
of the verdict as to the defendants' negligence and as 
to the absence of contributory negligence on plaintiff's 
part. As to the latter proposition, we offer the following 
reasons: 
1. As a business invitee plaintiff was entitled to 
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expect that the pren1ises 'vere safe for the purpose for 
which he had been invited. 
~. He, in fact, did not know of the existence of the 
. 
w1res. 
:~.If he had seen the wires, he would not have known 
they "·ere dangerous, and having seen them, unless some 
faet had come to his attention indicating that the defen-
dants had not made the wires safe, plaintiff was entitled 
to expect that they were safe. 
'I'hat plaintiff's position as a business invitee gives 
hint this protection is emphasized also in the Restate-
ment of Torts, Section 343: 
'\-\ possessor of land is subject to liability for 
bodily harm caused to business visitors by a nat-
ural or artificial condition thereon if, but only 
if, he 
(a) Knows, or by his exercise of reasonable 
care could discover, the condition which, if known 
to him, he should realize as involving an unrea-
sonable risk to them, and 
(b) Has no reason to believe that they will 
discover the condition or realize the risk involved 
therein, and 
(c) Invites or permits them to enter or remain 
upon the land without exercising reasonable care 
(i) to make the condition reasonably 
safe or 
(ii) to give warning adequate to en-
able them to avoid the harm. * * .': 
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In comment (d) the restaters state: "A busi-
ness visitor is entitled to expect that the pos-
sessor will take reasonable care to ascertain the 
actual condition of the premises and, having dis-
covered it, either to make it reasonably safe by 
repair, or to warn of the actual condition and the 
risk involved therein. Therefore_, a business visi-
tor is not required to be on the alert to discover 
defects * * * . This is of importance in determin-
ing whether the visitor is or is not guilty of con-
tributory negligence in failing to discover a de-
fect. * * * ." 
In view of plaintiff's ignorance of the wires, of the 
lack of notice of danger even if he had seen the wires, 
of defendants' high degree of responsibility to plaintiff 
to give him warning and of plaintiff's right to rely upon 
the defendant to give a warning when there is danger, 
and in view of the law as above set forth, we submit 
that the evidence in this case fully and amply support 
the findings by the jury that respondents were negli-
gent, the plaintiff was not contributorily negligent and 
that the defendants' negligence was the proximate cause 
of plaintiff's injuries. 
DEFENDANTS' CONDUCT COMES WITHIN 
THE DEFINITION OF RECKLESS AND 
'V ANrfON CONDUCT 
The jury also found that defendants' conduct was 
reckless and wanton. The pertinent facts on this issue 
are that all of the defendants, either directly or through 
their agents, knew of the danger and then deliberately 
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failed either to correct the situation or to give plaintiff 
any ,rarning of the danger. ~rhe Restatement of Torts, 
Section 500, reads as follows: 
H'['he actor's conduct is in reckless disregard 
of the safety of another if he intentionally does 
nn aet or fails to do an act which it is his duty to 
the other to do, knowing or having reason to 
kno\v the facts which would lead a reasonable 
tnan to realize that the actor's conduct not only 
creates an unreasonable risk of bodily harm to 
the other but also involves a high degree of prob-
ability that substantial harm will result to him." 
''Special Note: The conduct described in this 
section is often called 'wanton or wilful miscon-
duct' both in statutes and judicial opinions." 
''COMMENT: 
* * * * 
"c. In order that the actor's conduct may be 
reckless, it is not necessary that he himself rec-
ognize it as being extremely dangerous. His 
inability to realize the danger may be due to his 
reckless temperament or to the abnormally fa-
vorable results of previous conduct of the same 
sort. It is enough thaat he knows or has reason 
to know of circumstances which would bring 
home to the realization of the orcpnary, reason-
able man the highly dangerous character of his 
conduct. 
·'d. If the actor's conduct is such as to involve 
a high degree of chance that serious harm will 
result from it to anyone who is within range of 
its effect, the fact that he knows or has reason 
to know that others are within such range is con-
clusive of the recklessness of his conduct toward 
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them. It is, however, not necessary that the 
actors should know that there is anyone within 
the area made dangerous by his conduct. It is 
enough that he knows that there is strong proba-
bility that others may rightfully come within 
such zone. 
"e. * * * In order that the breach of such 
statute shall constitute reckless disregard for the 
safety of those whose protection it is enacted, 
the statute must not only be intentionally vio-
lated but the precautions required must be such 
that their omission will be recognized as involv-
ing a high degree of probability that serious 
harm 'viii result * * * . 
"f. Reckless conduct differs from intentional 
wrong doing in a very important particular. 
While an act to be reckless must be intended by 
the actor, the actor does not intend to cause the 
harm which results from it. It is enough that he 
realizes or, from facts which he knows, should 
realize that there is a strong probability that 
harm may result, even though he hopes or even 
expects that his conduct will prove harmless. 
* * * 
"g. Reckless conduct differs from negligence 
in several important particulars. It differs from 
that form of negligence which consists in mere 
inadvertence, incompetence, unskillfulness or a 
failure to take precautions to enable the actor 
adequately to cope with a possible or probable 
future emergency in that reckless misconduct 
requires a conscious choice of a course of action 
either with knowledge of the serious danger to 
others involved in it or with knowledge of facts 
which would disclose this danger to any reason-
able man. * * * " 
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This seetion of the Restate1nent is cited with ap-
proval in Ferguson vs. J ongsma, 10 Utah 2nd 179. 
l t is also cited with approval in Idaho as appears from 
the Utah ease of \\rood vs ,.fay lor, 8 Utah 2nd 210. 
\ \yhen the defendants knowingly and deliberately 
placed and 'vorked the crane so close to 7200 volt wires 
\rhich 'vere live and uninsulated, knowing that plaintiff 
and others whom they had invited for their, the defen-
dants', business interest would be exposed to great and 
substantial harm of the type which in fact did occur, 
then such conduct comes within the definition of reckless 
and ":anton conduct. 
DEFENDANTS P AULSENS' RESPONSI-
BILITIES AS BUSINESS INVITORS ARE 
THE SAME AS THOSE OF THE CHURCH 
Paragraph 383 of the Restatement (Torts) reads: 
"One who does an act or carries on an activity 
upon land on behalf of the possessor thereof, is 
subject to the same liability, and enjoys the 
same immunity from liability, for bodily harm 
caused thereby to others within and outside the 
land as though he were the possessor of the 
land. 
"COMMENT: 
"a. The words 'acting on behalf of the pos-
sessor' are used to indicate that the person in 
question is acting not only for the purpose of the 
possessor but also by his direction or consent and 
therefore by his direction or consent and there-
fore by his authority. One acting on behalf of 
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the possessor may do so as a servant or as an 
independent contractor." 
POINT II 
THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE 
FINDINGS THAT 'l.,HE SERVICES, OPER-
ATION AND TREATMENT PERFORMED 
BY DR. PEMBERTON WERE FOR IN-
JURIES SUSTAINED BY PLAINTIF.,F ON 
JANUARY I9, I960, AS A RESULT OF 1,HE 
NEGLIGENT CONDUCT OF DEFENDANTS 
PETERSEN AND PAULSEN. 
We come now, under Point II, to two of the reasons 
for the new trial order of the court. A third reason will 
be discussed under Point III. Inasmuch as the court 
did not give reasons for its action in the Order itself, 
we felt somewhat obligated to present the matters dis-
cussed under Point I. 
Nevertheless, from what the trial court has said, 
both on and off the record, its only reasons for granting 
a new trial, together with our comments thereon are as 
follows: 
I. That the plaintiff, in the court's view, did not 
produce adequate medical testimony to show that Dr. 
Pemberton treated the plaintiff for injuries received 
on January I9, I960. 
To support this theory, the court observes that after 
April I, I960, plaintiff did not go back to Dr. Smith 
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although Dr. Srnith testified: "I told hi1n if it continues 
to hurt hin1 to come in.'' (It. 492) . Thereafter, plaintiff 
sa\v no doctors until November (R. 255) 'vhen he went 
to doctors other than Dr. Smith. 'l.,he court believed 
that it 'vas possible during this period from April to 
Xovember that some other injury may have caused the 
trouble Dr. Pen1berton treated, and that one possibility 
"'as that plaintiff was injured anew while deer hunting. 
( ){. :J4!0, lines 8-12) . The court, in support of this 
theory, refers to the case of Alvarado vs. Tucker, 2 Utah 
~d 16. (R. 49:!). 'I.,he court was so concerned about this 
problem that it seriously considered directing a verdict 
in fa,·or of the defendants, but then decided to submit 
the case to the jury, but only after it had invited defend-
ant to file motions for judgment, notwithstanding the 
,·erdict. if the judgment was "not to the liking of 
defendants." The verdict was "not to the liking of defen-
dants," and respondents did file motions for judgment 
n.o.Y. The court did not grant their motions, but this 
problem still bothered the court and it is a reason for 
granting a ne\Y trial as gathered from statements made 
by the court from the bench during arguments on the 
post Yerdict motions and in chambers in the presence 
of counsel of both sides. 
The principal announced in the Alvarado case is, 
've submit quite inapplicable to this case. In that case, 
the defendant's liability depended entirely upon whether, 
at the time he drove his car into the plaintiff, he was 
exceeding the statutory speed limit of 25 miles per hour. 
The only evidence produced by plaintiff to prove ex-
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cessive speed was a witness who estimated defendant's 
speed as anywhere from 25 to 30 miles per hour. This 
court held that such evidence, standing alone, left the 
court with nothing but speculation and conjecture upon 
which to determine defendant's speed. The reasoning 
of the court was that if the only evidence as to speed is 
from a witness whose testimony was that defendant was 
as likely to be driving within the speed limit as it was 
that he was not within the speed limit, then plaintiff 
had not presented enough evidence from which a fact 
finder could do anything but speculate. It is a case where 
weighing evidence is impossible, and whatever decision 
the fact finder made, it would rest upon nothing but con-
jecture and speculation. 
The evidence which supports the findings that Dr. 
Pemberton's services to the plaintiff were for the in-
juries plaintiff received on January 19, 1960, is cer-
tainly not to be considered in the same class or of the 
same nature as the speculative nature of the evidence 
in the Alvarado case. We first observe that there is no 
need to speculate as to why plaintiff failed to respond 
to Dr. Smith's invitation to return to him in case of 
continuing pain and symptoms which originated on 
January 19, 1960. Plaintiff explained why he didn't 
return and the explanation was given while the doctor 
was in the court room and before he was released as a 
witness. Plaintiff testified: "'Veil, last time I was to 
Dr. Smith, he told me I had arthritis in my shoulder 
and that it was something I would have to live with." 
(R. 382). After this testimony, the Doctor was excused 
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without 1naking any effort to rebut this testimony. This 
was confirmatory of testimony plaintiff gave earlier 
( R •) r")•)) • . .... ~ . 
''(~. llow long did you keep in touch with Dr. 
Smith? 
1\. I went to him about 12 times. 
(~. Over what period of time? 
1\. From the time of the accident until April. 
Q. \ \r ould that be about the first of April? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What treatment did he prescribe for you? 
.t\.. Oh, he gave me some vitamin shots and pre-
scribed some pills, which I took. 
Q. And did this help? 
A. No; no-didn't to any extent. 
Q. Did he encourage you to-that there was 
anything else he could do for you by April I? 
.L~\.. No. He told me that is all he could do and it 
is just something I would have to live with 
the rest of my life and that I had arthritis. 
Q. Did he say where your arthritis was? 
A. He said it was in the shoulder." 
Before plaintiff took the stand and said what he 
is here quoted as saying at R. 382, Dr. Smith, at R. 374, 
on direct examination testified as follows : 
'\~. Exactly April I was the last time I saw him. 
Q. And at that time, did you tell him that he 
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needed no further help from you or any phy-
sician? 
A. No , I told him to would take a little time 
for the rest of it to get well and advised him 
to wait." 
The evidence as to plaintiff's pain and what he did 
about it following the injury of January 19, 1960, may 
be summarized as follows: 
(a) Plaintiff testified that from the time of the 
accident, the more he used his arm and shoulder, the 
more it hurt, and consequently, he developed a tendency 
of putting his left hand in his pocket and not using that 
side any more than he had to. (R. 253-254). 
(b) It pained him to shovel, so he a voided shovel-
Ing. (R. 254). 
(c) His arm would pain from doing most of the 
duties required of him as a driver and operator of a 
ready-mix truck. (R. 254). 
(d) From the date of this injury, because of its 
pain, he avoided overtime whenever the circumstances 
of the work permitted. ( R. 259, line 28 to R. 260, line 
44; also R. 260, line 20, to R. 261, line 1). 
(e) Beginning with plaintiff's injury of January 
19, 1960, and continuii1g to the present, with a certain 
amount of relief from the operation performed by Dr. 
Pemberton, Plaintiff has been unusually nervous and 
irritable with his wife and children as a result of his 
frayed nerves, which in turn is caused by the pain. "He 
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acts like he really doesn't have any control over it," and 
when he sleeps, instead of being "sound and still" as he 
wns before the accident, he, since the accident, "is con-
stnntly turning and jerking around; just moving all 
night.'' ( lt 350-351). 
(f) Dr. i>emberton not only found and removed 
an inflan1ed bursa which brought a relief to plaintiff 
\vhich he had not had since the injury of January 19, 
19ti0 (It. ~59, lines 2~-27; R. 299-300), but the Doctor 
also found, independent of the inflamed bursa, that the 
ligarnents of the '"ball" between the collar-bone and the 
shoulder blade were stretched or torn and that adhesions 
had formed their own scar tissue which stood between 
the rnuscle layers and the ligaments around the joint, 
n condition known as perio-arthritis. These adhesions, 
the Doctor believed, found their origin more likely not 
so n1uch from a fall or bump as from a jerking of the 
muscles such as would occur when they were stimulated 
by an electrical impulse. ( R. 301, lines 3-6; R. 320, 
lines 22-26). This, of course, is the source of the pain 
and the disability that has persisted not only since the 
accident, but has also continued since the operation and 
is the basis of his permanent partial disability and the 
source of the pain he will have as long as he lives. (R. 
301-303). 
2. ~-\ second reason for granting a new trial, as 
expressed by the court off the record, is that defendant 
produced evidence that plaintiff had hurt his left shoul-
der on two or three occasions prior to January 19, 1960, 
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and that this also created a causation problem in the 
court's mind tending to defeat plaintiff's showing that 
Dr. Pemberton's services were for injuries other than 
plaintiff received on January 19, 1960. 
Defendants' witness, Jacobsen, personnel manager 
at Utah Sand and Gravel, testified that one of his duties 
was to receive injury reports for the State Insurance 
Fund ( R. 432), and that in such capacity he had received 
a report from plaintiff inN ovember, 1957, which stated: 
''While turning truck around in small area, 
I pulled back muscles of upper back and left 
shoulder''. 
He is reported by this witness as not having seen 
a doctor at that time. (R. 434). This witness also fur-
nished a report that in July, 1957, plaintiff "had lifted 
the mixer chute and wrenched his back," and again no 
showing of plaintiff having seen a doctor. (R. 434). 
Finally, in September, 1957, a report was made to 
witness, Jacobsen, by Haslam and reported by the wit-
ness as follows : 
"While lifting chute, fellow worker dropped 
his end of chute causing patient to swing around 
and be hit by a 2x4 board in left shoulder, caus-
ing pain; pain developed more when employee 
returned to work Monday, 9-16-57, and was 
lifting chute again". 
For this injury, the witness reported, the plaintiff 
saw a Dr. Parker. (R. 436). 
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'fhe ,vitness, Jacobsen, also testified that none of 
these injuries kept plaintiff from his work. (R. 440}. 
Plaintiff. in explaining the effect of these injuries said 
they ,vere rninor, and had caused him discomfort for only 
a "dny or so.,, ( R. 477-478). Thus, these injuries re-
portt'd hy 'vitness, Jacobsen, were strictly minor acci-
druts and had occurred approximately 2lf2 years prior 
to .January 19, 1960. This explains why plaintiff had 
not testified of them earlier in the trial and also why 
he had said nothing about them to Dr. Pemberton -
they \vere not worth the mention. 
~lr. Berry asked Dr. Pemberton that if plaintiff 
had had previous injuries to the shoulder wouldn't it be 
a reasonable assumption that one of those injuries had 
caused the inflamed bursa. The doctor said it was pos-
sible, and that doctors always have to rely on the his-
tory the patient gives. (R. 311-312). Then later when 
plaintiff's counsel asked Dr. Pemberton to assume that 
plaintiff had no difficulty in operating the ready-mix 
truck and doing the work he was accustomed to do as 
such a truck driver would he have an opinion as to what 
really caused the inflamed bursa, Dr. Pemberton replied, 
''I believe it 'vas, assuming that this history that I got 
from him "yas true, it was my judgment, and still is, 
that the inflamed bursa was due to the injury he suffered 
in January, the year before I saw him-1960." (R. 318). 
It is worthy of note at this point, that the bulk of 
the damages awarded plaintiff by the jury was for 
shoulder injuries 'vhich were independent of the in-
37 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
flamed bursa injury. The operation corrected and cleared 
up the inflamed bursa but the permanent damage to 
and around the ligaments and muscles is damage that 
cannot be corrected by surgery or any other treatment 
now known, and is the source of his continuing pain 
and disability. 
Summarizing the issues under Point II, Dr. Pein-
berton's services corrected an inflamed bursa in the left 
shoulder which was injured January 19, 1960. There is 
negligible evidence submitted by the defendants Paulsen 
by which it was attempted to prove that plaintiff's in-
flamed bursa might have happened in 1957, or possibly 
in October or November of 1960. Both plaintiff and 
Dr. Pemberton established the bursa pain as orginating 
on January 19, 1960, and whatever the conflict as to 
when the injury treated by Dr. Pemberton occurred, 
such conflict was obviously a matter to be resolved by 
the jury. Inasmuch as the jury gave plaintiff special 
damages covering Dr. Pemberton's services, we must 
conclude that the jury resolved the conflict, if any, in 
favor of plaintiff. This issue in no way involved the more 
serious damage in plaintiff's shoulder, for which medical 
science has no cure. There is no basis here for a new trial. 
POINT III 
THAT THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS 
THE AMOUNT OF THE VERDICT AS TO 
BOTH SPECIAL AND GENERAL DAM· 
AGES AND NO PARrr OF THE AMOUNT 
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'riii•~ItEOF C.i\X llE .L\'f'fRIBUT-t\BLE '1,0 
'l'IIE IXI~,I~UE~l'E OF P.L\SSION AND PitE-
JLTI>ll~E ON Tl-IE l,AR'f OF THE JURY. 
J.\ third reason for the new trial order, as expressed 
hoth on the bench and in chambers, but off the record, 
the court thought that the jury was under the influence 
of passion and prejudice in arriving at the amount of 
darnnges because the jury at first awarded the plaintiff 
$50,000.00 general damages and $558.80 special dam-
uges against the Paulsens, and only $100.00 general 
dnrnages and $58.00 special damages in favor of the 
J>aulsens in their action against Petersen (R. 145), 
although the court had instructed the jury that damages 
in the one case must be the same as in the other. When 
the verdict was read, the court immediately reminded 
the jury of its instruction on this point, whereupon the 
jury promptly corrected the error and then rendered 
its verdict the same in both cases. 
\\r e can only speculate as to why the jury did what 
it did in its first effort; and such speculations are not 
proper or valid, simply because they are speculations, 
and are not a sound basis for a new trial. If one is to 
speculate, however~ it is inconceivable to us as to how 
one can arrive at the inference suggested by the trial 
court. In vie"· of the jury's subsequent action, where-
in it made the correction and rendered judgment against 
Petersen for the full amount_, there is only one reason-
able inference (other than that the jury at first simply 
misunderstood the court's instructions) , which is that 
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the jury's first effort was probably the result of sym-
pathy for the defendant Petersen, because he was a 
laborer undoubtedly without sufficient resources to pay 
a judgment of $50,000.00, or of any amount. The 
jury, however, in spite of such obvious sympathy, cor-
rected itself and rendered the verdict against him, thus 
removing even the ground from which the trial court so 
dubiously speculates. 
When the trial court speaks of passion and pre-
judice, it, of course, raises the problem of whether the 
evidence supports the amount of the verdict. We there-
fore feel obligated to discuss this problem. An excellent 
statement by this court as to the principles with which 
we are here involved is found in Duffy vs. Union Pacific 
Railroad Company, 118 Utah 82, 218 Pac 2d 1080: 
"Previously decided cases are of little value 
in fixing present day standards or in assisting 
courts in determining excessive awards ... Both 
the court and jury are required to deal with 
many unknown factors and a good guess is about 
the best that can be hoped for. The permissible 
minimum and maximum limits within which a 
jury may operate for a given injury are pres-
ently far apart and must continue to be wide 
spread so long as pain and suffering must be 
measured by many standards. If the jurors 
awarded damages which all reasonable persons 
would conclude were not outside permissible 
limits, we cannot invade their province by sub-
stituting our judgment for theirs, but when we 
believe that all reasonable minds would conclude 
the limits have been exceeded, we are permitted 
to correct the error". 
40 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Surely, in the instant case, all reasonable minds 
would not conclude that proper litnits have been ex-
eecrled. 'rhc faet is that the jurors followed the evidence 
Yery carefully. 1.,o attack the amount of the judgment 
hnsed upon passion and prejudice of the jurors is to 
ignore the evidence. The facts show that _:plaintiff's 
injuries caused pain, especially from the use to which 
he had to subject his arm and shoulder in his work. The 
pain caused hitn to reduce his working time when it was 
prnctical to do so. As often as not, he would have to 
keep on working even though the work aggravated the 
pain. l~ven so, there was a drop in his working time 
of frotn 10 to 15 per cent. The last full year of work 
under this handicap showed an actual relative loss con-
Yerted into wages at his present rate of pay of $957.00 
(Exhibit 16 P), which, with his normal life expectancy, 
indicates a future wage loss of approximately $40,-
000.00. And this does not reflect a further loss by virtue 
of taking other employment, as recommended by the 
Doctor, (R. 264} which may only be temporary, but 
\vhich pays less than 'vhat he actually earned in 1962. 
Then. added to this is the loss of wages during the year 
1961. the year he had the operation which amounted to 
~1381.00 (Exhibit 16 P). 
This evidence treats only of prospective and actual 
,,·age loss. Dr. Pemberton said the permanent partial 
disability was from 10 to 15 per cent. This presents an 
interesting correlation with the percentage of his reduced 
\vorking time and future wage loss. 
There can be no question that the permanent par-
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tial disability of his arm relates directly to his impaired 
earning capacity. His arm and shoulder hurt him when 
he works and this fact, along with the weakness, is 
directly responsible for his wage loss and for the advice 
of his doctor to seek other employment. 
The pain and suffering have taken, perhaps, even 
a more serious toll in the family than the wage loss, as 
serious as that is. The effect of this constant, daily irri-
tation from pain has been to make him irritable as a 
father and husband and has brought a disquieting in-
fluence and nervous strain into his home. This shows 
up not only in his sharp and sudden criticism of his 
children's normal behavior but also in frequent com-
plaining about his job and of his pain, whereas before 
the injury he liked his work. He used to be able to handle 
his job with ease, and he had a relish for the work. After 
the accident, it was a painful chore and a source of his 
frequent complainings in the home. Then there was the 
fact that he was a sound and restful sleeper before the 
injury, but after, it was fitful and disturbed. There is 
also an ugly incisional scar at the shoulder which will 
always be a source of mental suffering when the shoul-
der is exposed to public gaze. There is also the atrophe 
of the muscle around the shoulder joint which makes 
the end of the clavicle more prominent and very tender. 
These things are all permanent. 
This court, as above quoted, has listed the elements, 
any one or a combination of 'vhich have caused jurors, 
quite properly, to return, in the words of the court, "very 
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substantial verdicts." These elements as stated are: large 
wage losses. considerable tnedical costs, permanent dis-
ubility. a loss of bodily function, prolonged pain and 
suft'ering.'' ..:\fter giving this list, the court adds, "or a 
l'otnbina tion of all such consequences." In the Duffy 
case, frorn which this language is taken, the court found 
none of these elements as listed, yet the court was willing 
to pertnit $8500.00 of the general damages to stand. 
In the instant case, we have all the elements listed -
n large "·age loss, permanent disability, loss of bodily 
function, and prolonged pain and suffering. In the 
l)utl'y case the court adds: "Courts in sustaining the 
verdicts have given consideration to those elements of 
darnuges, and in addition, to such factors as the decreased 
purchasing power of the dollar, the increased cost of 
living. the possible continuation of the present inflation-
ary spiral, the social betterment of the individual, and 
the humiliation flowing from the loss of limbs or any 
other disfigurement." 
In ,·ie'v of all the foregoing, we submit that the jury 
in this case ,·ery carefully considered the evidence as 
to dan1ages, and applied that evidence with considerable 
cnre and judgment to the instructions of the court ir1 
reaching its verdict. There was and is no evidence of 
their being influenced in their judgment by passion 
and prejudice. 
As a final thought on this point, we mention the 
important fact that plaintiff was entitled to a judgment 
of punitive damages in this case, in view of the jury's 
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finding of wanton and reckless conduct, if he had asked 
for it. And because he did not ask for it, there has not 
been a breath of talk in this case which would even sug-
gest to the jury that they should return a verdict in-
volving a punishment of the defendants. The record 
of this case is sound and fully supports the amount 
of the verdict, independent of any consideration of 
punishment. When one carefully considers all the evi-
dence one must conclude that "all reasonable P,ersons 
would conclude that the damages awarded here are not 
outside permissible limits"; in which case, says the court, 
"We cannot invade the province of the jury by substi-
tuting our judgment for theirs." 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DIS-
CRETION IN ITS ORDER GRANTING A 
NEW TRIAL; AND THE JURY'S VERDICT 
AND JUDGMENT SHOULD BE RE-IN-
STATED. 
Plaintiff's position is that the record herein entirely 
supports the verdict of the jury and the right of the 
jury to render that verdict, and that the court in order-
ing a new trial exercised a power which was not within 
its discretion, or within its constitutional right to exer-
cise; and that it is appropriate for this court to give relief 
from such order at this time by nullifying the new trial 
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In ~lontgomery \V.ard and Company vs. Duncan, 
all lTS 24:J, the United States Supreme Court states 
that ltule ~>0 (b) "was adopted for the purpose of speed-
ing litigation and prct,entiny unnecessary retrials.n 
\\'here a motion to vacate a judgment raises the 
san1e questions as those raised in a motion for a ne'v 
trin 1. then disposition by the appellate court of an order 
vacating the judgn1ent is also determinative of the new 
trial order. 'fhus, if an appellate court restores to a 
plaintiff the verdict and judgment which a trial court 
has vacated, then the need for a new trial is eliminated. 
'rhis principle 'vas recognized in Vearn vs. Crane {1940, 
(' .l' .1\. 7th) , 114 Fed 896 where the court said: 
''It is well known that Rule 50 (b) was pro-
mulgated largely with the view of avoiding un-
necessary new trials, and it may well be that if a 
motion for a directed verdict raises the same 
questions as those raised by a motion for new 
trial, final disposition of the motion for directed 
verdict like,vise 'vill work conclusive determina-
tion of the questions presented by the motion for 
new trial." See annotation 85 Law Edition, 155 
at p. 172. 
In Moist Cold Refrigeration Company vs. Lou 
Johnson Company {1957), 249 Fed 2d 246, cert. denied, 
356 lTS 968, 69 ALR 2d 540, the Ninth Circuit Court 
of .L-\ppeals considered the appeal problems created 
where a trial court simultaneously grants both motions 
of a party asking for judgment n.o.v. together with a 
new trial under Rule 50 (b). The court summarized the 
possibilities open to the appellate court as follows: 
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"Disposition of an appeal, where the trial 
court granted both a motion for judgment, not-
withstanding the verdict, and a motion for a new 
trial, may take any of three alternative courses: 
The appellate court may (I) Affirm the trial 
court's action in granting judgment, notwith-
standing the verdict; ( 2) remand the case for a 
new trial, in accordance with the alternative or-
der of the district court ; or ( 3) hold that the 
alternative order granting the new trial was an 
abuse of discretion and reinstate the jury ver-
dict.n 
In the instant case the trial court set aside the ver-
dict and judgment based upon defendants' motion pur-
suant to Rule 50 (b). It did not grant defendants' motion 
n.o.v. If under Rule 50 (b) it is proper, indeed desirable 
where a trial court has abused its discretion, for the 
appellate court to reinstate a judgment for plaintiff 
and to nullify the new trial order where the trial court 
has granted judgment to the defendant n.o.v. and also 
granted a new trial, a fortiori, an appellate court can 
and should re-instate the verdict and judgment, which 
has only been set aside, and also nullify the new trial 
order. 
Even before the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
were adopted and at a time when Utah had a statute 
declaring that a new trial order was not an appealable 
order, this court recognized in Hirabelli vs. Daniels, 
44 Utah 88, 138 Pac 1172, that an appellate court should 
not withhold relief from a trial court's abuse of its dis-
cretion in granting new trials. This court said: 
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"X o n1at tcr ho"· often or how 'vhimsical or 
haseless the ground n1ay be on which the trial 
court may set a verdict aside and grant a new 
triaL nevertheless, an aggrieved party will be 
contpelled to accept \vhat the court may choose 
to allo\v or impose upon him or abandon his 
cause or defense; for, no matter how often a case 
rnay be tried, the trial court, for mere capricious 
not ions that the verdict is too large or too small, 
1nay set it aside until a jury is found to respond 
to the court's notions of what the verdict and 
damages should be; and if, perchance, the pro-
ceedings on the last trial are without error, 
neither party can complain. Surely the statute 
does not contemplate no relief can be granted 
from such a prostitution of the constitutional 
trial by a jury." 
Inasmuch as one of the purposes of Rule 50 (b) is 
to prevent unnecessary trials, and in view of the opinion 
of the Ninth C:ircuit Court of Appeals that an appellate 
court 1nay nullify a new trial order and re-instate a 
judgment which has been set aside under a Rule 50 (b) 
motion, the time has fully arrived for this court to give 
relief from a trial court's new trial order without first 
having to go through a useless retrial before obtaining 
such relief. 
CONCLUSION 
The good sense in our request that this court act 
now· in this case to give relief, rather than later, is 
enhanced by the fact that neither party here contends 
that a new trial 'vould produce any more or any less 
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or any different evidence than is now before the court. 
The same package of facts which the court now has 
before it will be no different after a new trial. If there 
is error in the record which has prejudiced the respon-
dents, as they contend, this court can deal with such 
errors now to a much greater advantage than later, 
because without the guiding direction of this court we 
have no reason to hope that the same errors of law 
would not again be made in a new trial. If, on the other 
hand, there is no error in the record adverse to respon-
dents, if they have had a fair trial, if they have not been 
prejudiced, and if the trial court abused its discretion 
in vacating the judgment and ordering a new trial, it 
would be most useless and most oppressive for plaintiff 
to be subjected to a new trial before this court gives 
relief. We appeal for relief now. 
Respectfully submitted, 
A. PARK SMOOT 
Attorney for Plaintiff and Appellant 
417 Felt Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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